

ON AN EXTRACT FROM THE ABHINAVABHĀRATĪ

In this paper it is intended to examine the implications of a number of technical terms occurring in a short but very significant extract from the sixth chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī*¹ having a lot of bearing on the principles of Indian aesthetics as propounded by Abhinavagupta.

After establishing the celebrated *rasa-sūtra*², according to which *rasa* is suggested through a delineation of the *bhāvas*, i.e., *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, Bharatamuni raises the question as to whether (i) *bhāvas* owe their origin to *rasas* or (ii) *rasas* owe their origin to *bhāvas* or (iii) *bhāvas* and *rasas* owe their origin mutually. In reply Bharata first says that *rasas* owe their origin to *bhāvas*, since the *bhāvas* are called so only because they « lead to the realisation » (*bhāvayanti*) « of these *rasas* » (*rasān imān*)³. Then Bharata concedes also to the third position, i.e., that of mutual causality. As already propounded *rasas* owe their origin to *bhāvas*, because the latter alone can lead to any aesthetic experience. But *bhāvas* also depend on the *rasas* since they are called *bhāvas* only because of being instrumental to the realisation of *rasas*. Out side the realm of aesthetic consideration

1. Published along with the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, ed. by M. R. KAVI. References are to vol. I, 2nd edn., 1956.

2. « *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ* », *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Ch. VI, p. 272, in vol. I, 2nd edn., 1956.

3. *nānābhīnayasambaddhān bhāvayanti rasān imān
yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvā vijñeyā nāṭyayoktṛbhiḥ.
nānādravyair bahuvidhair vyañjanam bhāvayate yathā
evam bhāvā bhāvayanti rasān abhinayaiḥ saha* (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI.34-35).

bhāvas are not called so⁴. Thus in fact it is not the *bhāvas* but only their nomenclature which owes its origin to *rasas*. Hence, although a state of mutual causality may be shown to be there with the help of an intelligent interpretation⁵, yet on strictly aesthetic grounds, *bhāvas* alone have the claim for being recognised as the cause of *rasas*. But this position happens to run counter to an earlier statement of Bharata himself, i.e., *na hi rasād rte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate*⁶. The literal meaning of this statement is either, « Nothing (i.e., *na kaścid arthaḥ*) can exist without *rasa* » or, « Nothing arises without *rasa* (i.e., without *rasa* as the cause) ». In view of the second meaning there arises the question as to how it could be justified to hold only that *rasas* owe their origin to *bhāvas* and not *vice versa* also. Apprehending such an objection Bharata says:

*yathā bījād bhaved vṛkṣo vṛkṣāt puṣpaṁ phalaṁ yathā
tathā mūlaṁ rasāḥ sarve tebhyo bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ*⁷.

Just as a tree occurs from a seed, and flowers and fruits from a tree, similarly *rasas* are the roots, and all *bhāvas* arise out of them (i.e., out of *rasas*).

On this Abhinavagupta comments as follows:

*nanu yadi bhāvebhyo rasās tarhi katham uktam « na hi rasād rte
kaścid apyārthaḥ pravartate. tena pūrvam ta evoddeśyāḥ » ityāśaṁ-*

4. Mammaṭa says that *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are called so only in case of a drama or a poem. In the practical world they are known simply as causes, effects and auxiliary causes respectively.

Cf. *karaṇānyatha kāryāṇi sahakāriṇi yāni ca
ratyādeḥ sthāyino loke tāni cen nātyakāvyaayoḥ.
vibhāvā anubhāvāśca kathyante vyabhicāriṇaḥ.
vyakāḥ sa tairvibhāvādyaiḥ sthāyibhāvo rasas smṛtaḥ.*

(*Kāvyaaprakāśa*, IV.27-28).

5. Cf. « ——— evaṁ trayo'pi pakṣāḥ kathañcidupagatā abhiprāyavaicitryeṇeti
tātparyam » (*Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 294).

6. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI, p. 272. Here Abhinavagupta explains this in three different ways. (i) From the view point of the theorist (*vyākhyātṛ*) it means that without *rasa* objects (*arthas*) like *vibhāvas* etc., do not come into existence so as to deserve an explanation by the theorists. (ii) From the view point of the actor it means that without *rasa* the purpose (*arthaḥ*) of giving delight cannot be served. (iii) From the view point of the spectator it means that once he gets absorbed in the relish of *rasa* the spectator ceases to have any idea of any other object (*artha*) like the *bhāvas* other than the *rasa* (*rasād rte*) separately.

Cf. « *hi yasmāt rasam vinā vibhāvādirartha buddhau
vyākhyeyatayā na pravartate yataśca tam vinā arthaḥ prayojanam
prītipurassaram vyutpattimayaṁ na pravartate yataśca rasam
pratyaḍṛte rasanātmakapratītyekaghanaviśrānte sāmājikaloke'nyo
bhāvādir arthaḥ pravibhāgena buddhau na vartate ——— ato
vyākhyātṛnaṭasāmājikaḥhiprāyeṇa ——— »* (*Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 271).

Under *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI.38, again Abhinava seems to have given in a general way a fourth meaning that « nothing arises without *rasa* as the cause ».

7. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI.38.

kyāha — yathetyādinā. bījaṃ yathā vṛkṣamūlatvena sthitaṃ tathā rasāḥ. tanmūlā hi prūtipūrvikā vyutpattirīti ta eva vyākhyānārṇhāḥ. kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasamvinmūlaś ca kāvyapurassaro naṭavyāpāraḥ. saiva ca samvit paramārthato rasāḥ. sāmājikasya ca tatpratītyā vaśikṛtasya paścād apoddhārabuddhyā vibhāvādipratītirīti prayojanaṃ nāṭye kāvyे sāmājikadhiyi ca. tadevaṃ mūlaṃ bijasthānīyaḥ kavigato rasāḥ. kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva. tata evoktaṃ « śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ » (dhvanyālo. 3.42) ityādyānandavardhanācāryena. tato vṛkṣasthānīyaṃ kāvyam. tatra puṣpādīsthānīyo' bhinayādīnaṭavyāpāraḥ. tatra phalasthānīyaḥ sāmājīkarasāsṣvādaḥ. tena rasamayam eva viśvam⁸.

From this we learn that just as the seed is the cause of the tree and the flower and the fruit, and the same seed also is the final effect, similarly *rasa*, realised by the poet, is the cause of poetical creation, and *rasa*, realised by the *sahṛdaya* (i.e., the aesthete), is the final effect. *Rasa* is a delectable knowledge or a delightful state of sensing. A dramatic presentation is preceded by the composition of a drama (which is also technically called a *kāvya*). The creation of the *kāvya* (i.e., the drama) proceeds from the feeling (*samvit*) of a sentiment in a generalised form (*sādhāraṇībhūta*) by the poet. That very feeling (*samvit*) belonging to the poet is in fact the *rasa*. The spectator (or the reader) also gets absorbed in the same delectable feeling. In this state of delightful absorption no distinct idea of the *vibhāvas* etc., occur to the aesthete. The knowledge of the *vibhāvas* etc., can arise only through a later analysis (*apoddhārabuddhyā*)⁹. Thus the same *rasa* is both the cause and the effect. For any poetical creation the poet must first experience the *rasa* himself, and only after that he would communicate it with words. In the matter of experiencing the generalised emotion the poet is as good as the spectator or the reader. That the poet himself must experience the *rasa* is warrented by Ānandavardhana's verse, « śṛṅgārī cet » etc.¹⁰. This involvement of *rasa*, both as the cause and the effect, leads Abhinavagupta to make a very serious observation that the whole universe is « made of *rasa* » (*rasamayam*).

Though the *rasa* realised by the poet immediately before the pronicess for creation does not seem to be the same as *rasa* technically defined, yet it is also nothing other than that. Ānandavardhana clearly shows that the realisation of an impersonal universalised *sthāyī* (i.e., permanent mood) is the cause of poetry. For, he says:

*kāvyaśyātmā sa evārthas tathā cādikaveḥ purā
krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvamāgataḥ¹¹.*

8. Abhinavabhāratī, p. 294.

9. Cf. Vākyapadīya, I.24, for the meaning of the term *apoddhāra*.

10. « śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvyे jātaṃ rasamayaṃ jagat

sa eva vītarāgaścen nīrasaṃ sarvaṃ eva tat » (Under Dhvanyāloka, III.42).

11. Dhvanyāloka, I.5.

[That very meaning (i.e., *rasa*) is the soul of poetry, and that is how the sorrow (i.e., *śoka*) of the First Poet, that arose out of the separation of the couple of the *krauñca* birds, took the form of a verse (i.e., *śloka*).]

Ānandavardhana confirms the implications of this *kārikā*¹² by saying that the *śoka* which took the form of *śloka* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *karuṇarasa*¹³. He means to say that not as a personal sorrow, but only as the universalised sorrow of a sympathetic heart, a *śoka* becomes the *sthāyibhāva* of *karuṇarasa*.

Abhinavagupta explains this position by saying: *na tu muneḥ śoka iti mantavyam*, It is not to be taken as a *śoka* of the sage himself. Then whose *śoka* is this? It is an impersonal *śoka*. It belongs to the *muni* and the bird alike, and in the same generalised form it is realised and relished by the *sahṛdaya*s (i.e., the aesthetes) also.

Thus in the realm of poetry there is no difference between the cause and the effect. But the poetical creation is also the same as the cosmic creation and the poet is rightly called the creator, Brahman: *apāre kāvyasaṁsāre kavirekaḥ prajāpatiḥ*¹⁴. If the poetical creation is an ideal one, the cosmic creation is also ideal.

The analogy of the seed and the tree which explains the non-difference of the cause and the effect in the realm of poetic creation conforms to a sort of monism or idealism. In fact the very process of *rasa*-realisation or aesthetic experience involves the principle of monism or non-difference in many ways, some of which are hinted at by the above passage of the *Abhinavabhāratī* itself, e.g., (i) *rasa* is a delightful knowledge or realisation (*prītipūrvikā vyutpatti*). But the delight and the realisation are both non-different from the realising self¹⁵. (ii) There is no difference between the poet and the reader. The reader is technically called a *sahṛdaya*, i.e., one who has a similar attitude of the heart. (iii) There is no difference between the feelings of the character depicted, the poet and the reader¹⁶. This happens through the processes of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* and *hṛdayasaṁvāda*. By the earlier process the situation, the characters and the spectators, all lose their spatial and temporal limitations. By the later process sentiments are shared by the spectator not only with other human beings, but also with animals and birds, etc. Thus an aesthetic experience involves the elimination of difference and the realisation of oneness with other human beings or other creatures.

12. The term *kārikā* means a memorial verse on any subject-matter of technical nature.

13. Cf. « *śoko hi karuṇasthāyibhāvaḥ* ».

14. Given under *Dhvanyāloka*, III.42.

15. This is warranted by the idea that the Absolute, which is non-different from the individual self, is Being-Consciousness-Delight, *sat-cit-ānanda*.

16. Abhinavagupta's teacher Bhaṭṭa Tauta says, « *nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ sa-māno'nubhavas tataḥ* ». Vide *Locana* under *Dhvanyāloka*, I.6.

Abhinavagupta opines that what has been stated in the passage of the *Abhinavabhārati* may be supported also from the angle of *Vijñānavāda*, *Dvidhābhīdhāna*, *Sphoṭatattva*, *Satkāryavāda* and *Ekatvadarśana*, etc. cf. *atra ca vijñānavādo dvidhābhīdhānaṁ sphoṭatattvaṁ satkāryavāda ekatvadarśanam ityādi ca draṣṭavyam*¹⁷.

This is the extract which particularly deserves a careful elucidation. Perhaps what Abhinava means to say is that certain points of *Vijñānavāda* etc., may be shown to have full agreement with certain aspects of the philosophy of *rasa*-realisation and particularly the principle of non-difference as hinted at by the passage quoted earlier. For examining these agreements let us take the doctrines viz., *Vijñānavāda*, etc., one by one.

VIJÑĀNAVĀDA — The school of *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda* maintains a thorough-going idealism. Accordingly the world is built of consciousness and has no more reality than a dream¹⁸. The most striking point relevant to the present context is that in *Vijñānavāda* no difference is maintained between (i) the cognised (*grāhya*) and the cogniser (*grāhaka*), and between (ii) the cognised and the cognition (*taddhīh*, i.e., « the knowledge of that »).

(i) In a *Kārikā*, given in the *Sāstradīpikā*, it is succinctly put that according to *Vijñānavāda* « there is no perceptible object other than the knowledge itself. But there is no later cognition of a perception as well. *Buddhi* or *Vijñāna* or consciousness or knowledge alone shines because of the absence of separate entities called perceptible (*grāhya*) and the perceiver (*grāhaka*) »¹⁹. (ii) In *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya* it is stated that « there is a lack of difference (*abheda*) between the blue colour (*nīla*) and the knowledge of the same (*taddhīh*), since they are both perceived together as a rule. (*sahopalambhaniyamāt*). Whatever difference is noticed is because of an erroneous perception just as (through error of vision or due to disease of the eyes) the single moon is observed to be two »²⁰.

DVIDHĀBHIDHĀNA — This term literally means « naming the same thing with two different names ». As far as my information goes *dvidhā-*

17. *Abhinavabhārati* (vi), p. 294. Abhinavagupta, however, does not go into the details of the points of correspondance, for the fear of being accused of indulging in an exhibition of his scholarship. Cf. « *vayaṁ tu prakṛtānupayogi ————— ityāstām* », *loc. cit.*

18. Cf. A. L. BASHAM, *The Wonder that was India*, London, 1954, p. 279.

19. Cf. *nānyo'nubhāvyo buddhyā'sti tasyā nānubhavo'paraḥ grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate. Sāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathimīśra, with the com. *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī*, Chowkhamba, Benares, 1916.

20. Cf. *sahopalambhaniyamādabheda nīlataddhīyoḥ bhedaśca bhrāntivijñānair drśyatendāvivādvaye,*

Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti, I.

See also K. C. PANDEY, *Abhinavagupta An Historical And Philosophical Study*, 2nd edn. Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1963, p. 711.

bhidhāna is not a familiar term. I could trace out this term neither in the notable modern works on Indian philosophy nor also in the other works of Abhinavagupta. But I am led to believe that it may have something to do with the concept of creation as detailed in the *Ahīrbudhnyasāṁhitā*²¹. In this work there are certain expressions which I conjecture to be at the root of the formation of the term *dvidhābhidhāna*. Let me first quote the relevant portions and then show the points of similarity:

*atha śuddhetarasṛṣṭivarnanāṁ nāma ṣaṣṭho'dhyāyaḥ
(tatra śaktitadvato bhēdavadabhēdasyāpyupapattiḥ)
ahīrbudhnyāḥ:*

*yo'sau nārāyaṇo devaḥ paramātmā sanātanaḥ
ahambhāvātmikā śaktistasya taddharmadharminī. (1)
tāvimāvekaḍhaivoktau bhēdyabhēdakabhāvataḥ
prthaktvena ca śāstreṣu jagaddhetutayoditau. (2)*

*atha śuddhetarasṛṣṭivarnanāṁ nāma saptamo'dhyāyaḥ —
(adhyāyadvayasāṁkṣepaḥ)*

bhūyaśca śṛṇu saṁkṣepam imāṁ nārada tattvataḥ. (64b)

*ekā śaktir harer viṣṇoḥ sarvabhāvānugāminī
devī śāḍguṇyapūrnā sā jñānānandakriyāmāyī. (65)*

*bhāvabhāvabhāvabhāvena sā dvidhābhāvamṛcchati
bhāvakaḥ tatra saṁkalpaḥ sudarśanamāyo hareḥ. (66)*

*avyāghātas tu yas tasya sā sudarśanatā mune
jñānamūlakriyātmāsau svacchaḥ svacchandacinmayāḥ. (67)*

*bhāvyo nāma parāṁśo yaḥ sā bhūtiriti gīyate
saṁkarṣaṇādibhūmyantā śuddhetaravibhāginī. (68)²²*

The purport of these verses, briefly put, is as follows:

The creative potentiality (*śakti*) of Hari is not a physical power involving mechanical movement; « but it is in a sense homogeneous with God »²³. It is of the nature of pure selfdetermined thought (*svacchandacinmaya*); it is a thought in potentiality, a thought that is to realise itself in subject-object forms, manifesting itself as a spiritual thought movement (*jñānamūlakriyātmā*). It is this spiritual movement of that *śakti*, which by self-diremption splits itself up (*dvidhābhāvamṛcchati*) as the thought of God (*saṁkalpa*), the determiner (*bhāvaka*), and the passive objectivity (*bhāvya*), called *prakṛti*. Through the *saṁkalpa*, which is *bhāvaka*, the *bhāvya prakṛti* develops and differentiates itself into the categories occurring in the form of a ramification from *prakṛti* onward. Now let us see the points of similarity:

(1) The term *dvidhābhidhāna* in *Abhinavabhāratī* refers to a concept of non-difference between the cause and the effect. In *Ahīrbudh-*

21. It is noteworthy that this tantric text was also a product of Kashmir.

22. *Ahīrbudhnyasāṁhitā*, Adyar Library, Madras, 1916, pp. 70-2.

23. Cf. « *bhedavad abhedasyāpyupapattiḥ* ».

nyasarṁhitā there is a similar expression *dvidhābhāvam ṛcchati* in a similar context.

(2) In *Abhinavabhāratī* the poetical creation (and as a matter of fact the whole cosmic creation) is ideal in so far as it proceeds from *rasa*, « *tena rasamayam eva viśvam* ». The whole world is a *vikāra* (i.e., just an evolved form) of *rasa*. This *rasa* is a *samvit* (i.e., a consciousness) or a *jñāna* (i.e., a knowledge), « *saiva samvit paramārthatō rasaḥ* ». In *Ahīrbudhnyasarṁhitā* also the creation proceeds from an ideal thought, a *saṁkalpa*, which proceeds from a *śakti*, which also involves a *samvit* being *jñānamūlakriyātmā*.

(3) But this *śakti* is identical with the *śaktimān* Hari (i.e., the God endowed with the *śakti*). There is an *abheda* (i.e., non-difference) of the two. It is only in the *śāstras* that they are separately spoken of as the causes of the world. The expression « *prthaktvena uditau* » given in this context has a striking similarity with the term « *dvidhā abhidhāna* ».

(4) In the theory of *rasa*-realisation there is no difference between the knower (*jñātṛ*) and the object of knowledge (*jñeya*). *Jñātṛ* and *jñeya* are the different names (*dvidhābhidhāna*) for the same thing. According to the *Ahīrbudhnyasarṁhitā* also the Devī (i.e., the *śakti*), who is on her own part identical with Hari (i.e., Nārāyaṇa) just assumes (*ṛcchati*) a duality (*dvidhābhāvam*) in the form of *bhāvya* and *bhāvaka*, the object of perception and the perceiver²⁴.

(5) Likewise in Abhinavagupta's theory of aesthetic experience also there is no difference between the *puruṣa* (i.e., the aesthete)²⁵ and the *rasa* realised by him. The *puruṣa* himself is *rasa*. While commenting on the *Kārikā*:

*sukhaprāyeṣu saṁpannaḥ ṛtumālyādisevakaḥ
puruṣaḥ pramadāyuktaḥ śṛṅgāra itī saṁjñītaḥ*²⁶.

A *puruṣa* endowed with most of the pleasures, used to the enjoyment of seasons, garlands, etc., and accompanied by a woman is called *śṛṅgāra*²⁷, Abhinavagupta says: *puruṣa itī bhoktā saṁvedanātmako'bhipretaḥ. bhoktaiva ca sthāyīsaṁvidrūpaḥ. vyabhicārīnastu bhogasvabhāvāḥ. tena ratireva puruṣaḥ. tathā cōktaṁ — śraddhāmāyo'yaṁ puruṣa itī*²⁸.

The word *puruṣa* here is intended to mean the realising aesthete who relishes (the *rasa*). One who relishes (the *rasa*) himself is of the

24. Cf. lines 65b and 66a.

25. It is to be remembered that in the time of *rasa*-realisation the aesthete realises an identity with the character depicted on the stage or in the *kāvya*.

26. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI.46.

27. *Rasa* in general is implied by the term *śṛṅgāra*, which is the name of the foremost variety of *rasa*.

28. *Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 311.

nature of a realisation of the *sthāyibhāva*, the permanent mood. The *vyabhicārībhāvas* are of the nature of a relish. Hence, the aesthete (*puruṣa*) and the permanent mood of love (*rati*) are identical. A similar expression where a person is said to be identical with an abstract mental attitude is « *śraddhāmāyo'yaṁ puruṣaḥ* », « This person is all devotion ».

Thus, on the basis of these points of similarity with the theory of creation as given in the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* we may form an idea about what is probably intended by the term *dvidhābhīdhāna*, and we may perhaps be justified also to take the said theory of creation itself as what is actually implied by the term in the extract from the *Abhinavabhāratī*.

SPHOṬATATTVA — The correspondance of the theory of *sphoṭa* with the aforesaid speculations on aesthetic experience may perhaps be shown as follows: (1) In the analogy of the seed and the tree, the *rasa* belonging to the poet is the seed or the cause²⁹ and the relish of the *rasa* by the spectator, or so to say the *rasa* belonging to the spectator³⁰ is the fruit or the effect³¹. Thus the cause and the effect are identical. In the *sphoṭa* theory, *sphoṭa* is the *nitya āntara akhaṇḍa arthavān śabda*; the speaker gives vent to this *sphoṭa* or inner real *śabda* belonging to himself³² with the audible *vaikharī* sounds which on their own part suggest the *sphoṭa* belonging to the listener, who understands the meaning accordingly. In fact *sphoṭa* is one and unlimited and partless. Hence, the same *sphoṭa* pervades the hearts of both the speaker and the listener, just as the same *rasa* belongs to both the poet and the aesthete. *Sphoṭa* of the speaker being the cause has no difference with *spōṭa* of the listener as the effect³³. (2) The term *sphoṭatattva* in the quoted passage of *Abhinavabhāratī* may also mean the whole philosophy of word and meaning propounded by Bhartṛhari, according to which the same solitary Brahman having no difference of any sort appears as it were to have difference because of assuming the potentialities to create. cf.

*ekameva yad āmnātaṁ bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt
aprthakte'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthakteveneva vartate*³⁴.

This has a clear correspondance with *dvidhābhīdhāna* explained above. (3) Bhartṛhari says that the same Brahman assumes the form of *bhoktṛ*, *bhoktavya* and *bhoga*. *Bhoktṛ* is the subject that experiences, *bhoktavya* is the object of experience, and *boga* is the experience. What is indicated is that there is no difference between the said three principles

29. Cf. « *mūlaṁ bījasthānīyāt kavigato rasaḥ* ».

30. As shown earlier the relish itself is the *rasa*.

31. Cf. « *phalasthānīyaḥ sāmājīkarasāsvādaḥ* ».

32. For the idea of the « inner word » of the speaker cf. *Vākyapadīya*, I.131.

33. Cf. MUKUNDA MADHAVA SHARMA, *Vyañjanāprapañcasamikṣā*, Chaukhamba Orientalia, Varanasi, 1979, p. 90.

34. *Vākyapadīya*, I.2.

just as in the theory of *rasa*, it is maintained that, there is no difference between *jñātr*, *jñeya* and *jñāna*. (4) Abhinavagupta concludes that the whole world is made of *rasa*; *rasamayam eva viśvam*. As indicated in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*³⁵, *rasa* is Brahman. In the philosophy of *Bhartṛhari śabda* is Brahman. In the final analysis *rasa* is identical with *śabda*, both being identical with Brahman. Bhartṛhari also says that the whole world is only a *pariṇāma* (i.e., transformation) of the *śabdatattva*³⁶.

SATKARYAVĀDA — According to this doctrine of the Sāṃkhya philosophy an effect should necessarily be already present in the cause in a latent form. For example, the curd, which is an effect of the milk, remains latent in the milk itself before coming into existence as curd. This implies that the cause just assumes a new form and appears as the effect, and there is no ontological difference between the cause and the effect. This doctrine bears a correspondance with the position that the *rasa* belonging to the poet as the cause has no difference with the *rasa* belonging to the spectator as the effect.

EKATVADARŚANA — Like *dvidhābhīdhāna*, this is also not a very celebrated term. This term may literally mean either (i) the philosophy of oneness or (ii) the act of perceiving oneness (of various objects). It has been already stated that the realisation of *rasa* depends on a process of generalisation (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) involving elimination of all differences between, and realisation of oneness with, all other individual creatures. Philosophically this is as good as recognising all other creatures as similar to one another and non-different from the perceiver himself. This attitude may, hence, be called *samadarśana* also. In the passage concerned Abhinavagupta perhaps implies this very attitude of *samadarśana* with the term *ekatvadarśana*. This seems to be warranted by the following comment of Abhinavagupta, containing the terms *samadarśana(tva)* and *ekīkaraṇa* (i.e., *ekikuryāt*):

*sarvabhūteṣu ātmānaṁ grāhakatayā anupraviśantaṁ bhāvayet, ātmani ca grāhyatājñānadvāreṇa sarvāṇi bhūtāni ekīkuryāt; ataśca samadarśanatvam saṁjāyate yogaśceti saṁkṣepārthaḥ*³⁷.

This occurs in his *Bhagavadgītārthasaṁgraha* on *Gītā*, vi.29³⁸, and the concerned verse is:

*sarvabhūtastham ātmānaṁ sarvabhūtāni cātmani
īkṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatrasamadarśanaḥ*.

35. Cf. « *raso vai saḥ* », *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II.7.

36. Cf. *Vākyapadīya*, I.1. Bhartṛhari uses the term *vivarta* (« *vivartate* ») here in the sense of *pariṇāma*.

37. This is quoted in K. C. PANDEY'S, *Abhinavagupta An Historical And Philosophical Study*, Varanasi, 1963, p. 40.

38. K. C. Pandey gives the number as VI.30. The present number is given here in the light of S. RADHAKRISHNAN'S, *The Bhagavadgītā*, 4th impression, London, 1956.

This is out and out based on monism, and the same monism is the bed-rock of Abhinavagupta's theory of aesthetic experience. In the comment quoted above Abhinavagupta says that the devotee should conceive of (*bhāvayet*) his own self as present in (and hence identical with) all the creatures as the cognitive agent (*grāhakatayā*), and should conceive of an oneness of all the creatures with the idea of their presence in (and hence identity with) his own self as the objects of cognition (*grāhya*)³⁹. This should lead to the feeling of similarity and the attainment of *yoga*. It is significant that here also there is the recognition of a non-difference between the object of cognition (*grāhya*) and the agent of cognition (*grāhaka*). The feeling of oneness needed for *rasa*-realisation should pertain not only to all human beings, but also to all varieties of creatures. Abhinavagupta perhaps gives the first illustration of *rasa* with a verse that describes the frightened deer⁴⁰ with the idea of implying this very aspect of monism.

Gauhati University. Assam, India.

39. Seeing of the self as abiding in all beings and of all beings as abiding in the self is at the root of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* and *hṛdayasamvāda*.

40. I.e., the verse « *grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam* », etc. (*Sakuntalā*, I.7), Vide *Abhinavabhārati*, p. 279.